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Legal Culture
1. Term
Legal culture has been intensively discussed in legal discussions over the last
twenty years or so, especially in connection with the Europeanisation of private
law. Often, national legal culture is simply viewed as an obstacle to → European
private law; a European legal culture is viewed as its prerequisite. What is actually
meant by legal culture often remains unclear: legal culture is considered
important, but an exact definition is not. Moreover, the problems bound up in the
concept of culture, which related disciplines – especially anthropology and
sociology – have tackled, are widely ignored.
The term legal culture refers to multiple different ideas, which are not always
sufficiently separated. Legal culture often describes merely an extended
understanding of law and is thus synonymous with „living law“ (Eugen Ehrlich)
or „law in action“ (Roscoe Pound). Sometimes, the term legal culture is used
interchangeably with the term → legal family or legal tradition. More specific
concepts exist as well. Legal sociologists especially understand legal culture as
the values, ideas and attitudes that a society has with respect to its law (Lawrence
M. Friedman, James Q. Whitman). Sometimes legal culture itself is seen as a
value and placed in opposition to the barbarism of totalitarianism (Peter Häberle);
here, legal culture is used synonymously with the rule of law. Others understand
culture as certain modes of thinking; they speak of episteme or mentalité (Pierre
Legrand), legal knowledge (Annelise Riles) and collective memory (Niklas
Luhmann), law in the minds (William Ewald) or even cosmology (Rebecca
French, Lawrence Rosen). In addition, an anthropologically influenced
understanding exists of legal culture as the practice of law (Clifford Geertz).
Sometimes, borders are fluid, both among these concepts themselves and
between them and other concepts such as legal ideology (Roger Cotterell) or legal
tradition (H. Patrick Glenn, Reinhard Zimmermann). Some definitions bring
different aspects together. Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, for example,
name six elements: legal terminology, legal sources, legal methods, theory of
argumentation, legitimising of the law and common general ideology. A similar
combination of disparate elements underlies the definition of the styles of legal
families (Konrad Zweigert, Oliver Remien).
2. Law and Culture
An interrelationship between culture and law has long been postulated. Baron
de Montesquieu postulated in his “Esprit des Lois” (1748) the necessity for
positive law to be adapted to the geographical features of the country and the
cultural characteristics of its people. In the 19th century the idea of law as the
cultural accomplishment of a particular people (as well as the attempt to
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determine the „spirit“ of particular law) became popular. At the same time, the
term culture was also used for a higher stage in the development of law, which
overcame the sectionalism of lower stages. When Friedrich Carl von Savigny
explained law as a cultural achievement, what he had in mind was likely more a
European legal culture of legal elites than a national “Volksgeist” limited to
Germany. In the 20th century, Max Weber established a comparative cultural
sociology of law and introduced with it the idea of rationality as culture, a core
criterion for western law that still finds wide acceptance today, even though
Weber saw considerable cultural differences within this western law, especially
between civil law and common law.
Legal culture stands between law and culture, with unclear borders in both
directions. According to a widespread understanding, legal culture represents that
cultural background of law which creates the law and which is necessary to give
meaning to law. This encompasses the role of law in society, the role of different
legal sources, the actual authority of different actors and institutions, etc.
However, nearly all such elements can also be described as part of law (as long as
law is not limited to legal rules). This confluence is not surprising: Given that
culture has traditionally been defined in opposition to nature, since the downfall
of natural law, all law must necessarily be cultural. For the same reason, legal
culture cannot sensibly be separated from law, and it is not entirely clear that the
term legal culture provides analytical advantages over a broad and encompassing
concept of law.
Equally problematic is the relationship between legal culture and general
culture. Legal culture is often viewed as that part of the culture which concerns
itself with law. However, law is relevant in nearly all areas of life, so it is difficult
to draw a sharp division between legal culture and general culture. More useful is
the division between internal and external legal culture introduced by Lawrence
M. Friedman (but already visible in Savigny). Internal legal culture describes the
attitude towards law of legal actors such as judges and lawyers; external legal
culture describes the attitude towards law of the general population. Legal
sociologists frequently consider the external legal culture as more important;
doctrinal lawyers, by contrast, focus more on internal legal culture. The more
autonomous law is within the society, the more important internal legal culture
becomes in comparison to external legal culture. Often, these analyses presume a
relatively homogenous and static concept of culture: Culture is used with a view
to a community (frequently a nation-state) and provides this group with its
identity, by establishing internal coherence and external difference, as well as
relative consistency over time. All of these elements – focus on the nation-state,
internal coherence, external isolation, lack of change – have in the meantime
become very doubtful in anthropology and sociology. Nevertheless, in the legal
debate they are often still presumed to be self-evident (see infra 6).
3. Relevance
Legal culture is frequently viewed as the cause for certain characteristics of a
legal system. For instance, that Swedish law is less systematic than German law is

2

supposedly caused by the German preference for order. That English
constitutional law prioritises the businessman and French law prioritises the
consumer (→ Consumers and Consumer Protection Law) supposedly reflects the
different attitudes of the respective countries toward the free market. That U.S.
procedural law is friendlier to plaintiffs than European law supposedly rests on
different understandings of the role of law in society.
Such conclusions are widespread but problematic. They presume that culture
exerts influence on law, but they neglect that the reverse is also true, that law
influences culture. They also overlook the difficulties of observing legal culture
independently from law. In fact, this causal analysis is often circular. For
example, → codification in civil law countries is sometimes explained as a
reflection of the higher value civil law places on systematisation and
completeness as opposed to common law (→ Legal Families, Doctrine of). At the
same time, however, the proof that civil law countries prefer systematisation and
completeness is found precisely in the fact that they are supposed to explain,
namely, the fact that codification exists in civil law but not in common law
systems. Cultural analysis like this can in the best case recognise coherence – a
preference for order in law correlates with a similar preference in traffic – but not
what is cause and what is effect.
Legal culture is more important in explaining and predicting the effect of law
on society, such as in the extent to which promulgated laws will be adhered to and
judgments will be implemented. Whether legal reform will be successful depends
to some degree on legal culture. That is especially relevant for legal transplants
between legal systems with different legal cultures (→ Reception of Law). Some
believe that such transplants are possible without problems only for legal norms
that are largely independent of culture, though there is no unanimity about which
legal norms are included – almost all (Alan Watson), almost none (Pierre
Legrand) or only those of economic law in contrast to family and inheritance law
(Ernst Levy). Culturally dependent legal norms are thought to be transferable only
between legal systems with similar legal cultures. Newer studies have shown it
more probable that the success of a legal transplant depends on the legal system of
the receiving country and its culture (Otto Kahn-Freund, Daniel Berkowitz &
Katharina Pistor). If, as is frequently the case, the transplanted legal norm or
institution interacts with the recipient legal culture in other ways than it does with
the donor legal culture (Gunther Teubner speaks in this context of legal irritants
instead of legal transplants), this does not signify a failed transplant.
Legal culture is also relevant for the creation of → uniform law. Even if the
law of different states is formally unified, each state will likely adapt the unified
law according to its respective legal culture. This can stand in the way of effective
legal unification. The CISG (→ Sale of Goods, International [Uniform Law]), for
instance, is interpreted differently in different legal systems. However, reciprocal
effects can be found here as well: legal unification can also produce a unified
legal culture. That was the case with the French Civil Code, which reconciled the
Roman-law influenced culture of written law in the South (Roman law) with the
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Germanic-law customary law in the North and spawned a French legal culture.
Some hold similar hopes for a → European civil code.
4. National Legal Cultures
If one understands legal culture as applying not to individuals but to a group,
legal culture requires a relatively homogenous group. Often, the nation-state is
postulated as such a group; comparison is made between, for example, French and
British legal culture (John Bell). Such inquiries often reveal substantial
differences that arise, even between similar states: for example, the litigation rate
in Germany is very high, in the Netherlands very low (Erhard Blankenburg). The
institutional differences that are responsible for this – in the Netherlands many
more alternative methods of alternative dispute settlement exist – need not,
however, necessarily be described as culture. Be that as it may, studies have
shown that attitudes and practices toward the law between nation-states have
traditionally demonstrated large differences (James L. Gibson, Gregory A.
Caldeira).
European private law has long taken different national legal cultures into
consideration. Especially in private law, harmonisation through → Directives was
long preferred over unification through → Regulations because Directives enable
every member state to reach a common goal within and in accordance with its
respective national legal culture. Member states can establish limited exceptions
to regulations promoting the → European internal market based on their own legal
culture, especially in the form of national values as → public policy (ordre public)
or as general interest. However, such invocations of national legal culture are
subject to control and restrictions by Community Law. Finally, the discussion
about a → European civil code shows the power of national legal cultures. The
resistance against rules, many of which would not even be mandatory, is widely
grounded in legal culture. In England there is the fear that a European codification
would destroy the very different legal culture of the common law (a similar
criticism was brought against the Europeanisation of private international law). In
France and Germany there is the reverse fear: by replicating national codifications
on the supranational level, a European codification will effectively rob national
legal culture of its most important achievement.
5. European Legal Culture
Besides invocations of national culture, the view exists that a European legal
culture is either already existent or is being created through the Europeanisation of
law. Even more than is the case for nation-states, this makes it necessary to justify
why Europe is the reference unit, in what way a common legal culture
encompasses European nations on the one hand and distinguishes them from nonEuropean states on the other. The political and economic similarities between
countries of the European Union are a somewhat arbitrary indicator for common
legal culture because, for instance, Switzerland would then have to be left out.
A more promising foundation lies in the common legal heritage of the ius
commune. The ius commune was always more a legal method and legal culture
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than a unified corpus of legal rules. This asserted historical foundation
necessitates, on the one hand, demonstration that the differences between common
law and civil law are not as strong as are widely believed. Such demonstration has
been impressively achieved in recent studies on the doctrine and argumentative
structures of private law. On the other hand, non-European legal systems have
also been influenced by this tradition – especially those of North America and
Australia, but also those on other continents. European legal culture in this sense
has become western or even global (modern) legal culture, for which Europe is
merely the origin, but no longer the centre of reference.
Furthermore, European legal culture can be based on common European
values. Here also the problem is to what extent such values are European or rather
western. However, the emphasis on values makes it possible to distinguish
European culture especially from that in the United States, because several
elements of European culture are quite different from that in the United States: a
less instrumental understanding of law, a stronger autonomous private law,
stronger protections for the weaker party in contract law, stronger emphasis on
human dignity and privacy, etc.
Some scholars have suggested concrete criteria for European legal culture.
Franz Wieacker names three relatively abstract elements of European legal
culture, which he sees as historically invariable: personalism, legalism,
intellectualism. Peter Häberle, who sees Europe first and foremost as a
“community of legal culture,” enumerates six somewhat disparate criteria:
historicism, scientific character of legal reasoning and doctrine, judicial
independence, ideological and religious neutrality of the state, legal culture as
both diversity and uniformity, and particularity and universality of European legal
culture. Reinhard Zimmermann combines elements of both approaches and traces
them back to the Roman law and Christian traditions. In addition to the tension
between diversity and unity he names written character, rationality, adaptability,
learned character, division between law and non-law (religion, morality),
dominance of private law and centrality of the person.
Sometimes the EU itself is said to have its own legal culture – or non-culture
(which analytically is the same thing). What is meant by that is especially the
style of EU law in comparison to that of the member states: its dynamic character,
sector-specific structure, its market-based legitimacy, etc. Responsibility for this
style is attributed to EU-civil servants, who on the one hand represent their own
different national legal cultures and on the other hand are relatively homogenous
in their positive attitude toward the EU. However, these Brussels bureaucrats are
assisted in the compilation of European private law through the advice and work
of national lawyers all over Europe. Insofar as an EU culture exists, it is unclear
which societal groups it encompasses and with whose legal culture it could be
contrasted.
6. Criticism
At the same time at which the term culture became popular in legal studies, it
began to be questioned, at least as a general concept, in anthropology and
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sociology, the fields from which legal studies adopted the term. Many of the
problems that those fields recognised with the term culture are relevant also for
legal culture, but many lawyers have not yet sufficiently recognised those
problems.
One major problem has already been mentioned: culture and legal culture are
often used without exact definition and in relation to very different questions.
Such vagueness not only puts the explanatory value of the term in question.
Moreover, it creates the risk that an analysis of foreign law will be biased by
stereotypes about the purported culture of that law
A connected problem is that of essentialised culture. Often, a particular legal
culture is asserted to exist and then for this reason alone deemed either deserving
of protection or (less often) of rejection. A national codification, for instance, is
thought worthy of preservation merely because it represents a cultural
achievement. Such discussions of legal culture frequently have the potential to be
quite conservative or even reactionary: changes are rejected with an often
consciously irrational reference to legal culture.
These problems stem from a conception of culture which has been found
problematic. According to this conception, cultures are internally consistent, have
relatively clearly defined borders, and are historically largely constant. Such a
conception threatens to conceal differences within a particular legal culture while
overestimating differences with other legal cultures. So it is, for instance, with the
demarcation between civil and common law, which makes differences between
them absolute while ignoring the considerable differences among individual civil
law systems. Differences are often greater within individual legal systems than
between them: the Milan partner of a large law firm has more in common with his
colleague in Hong Kong than with a solo practitioner in his own city. New legal
cultures emerge along functional differences, such as the global legal culture of
arbitration (Yves Dezalay, Bryant G. Garth). In addition, a particular legal culture
almost always faces internal tension. The values of a society, its way of thinking
and its practices are constantly questioned in most societies. A unified legal
culture is frequently claimed only by those who benefit from it.
On these grounds, the presumption that legal culture is unchangeable is also
problematic. Its development certainly displays a certain path dependency
(Anthony Ogus). But, for example, German law has experienced so many
disruptions between 1800 and today that one can speak of a unified legal culture
only at a very high level of abstraction.
On balance, the use of the term legal culture in general law and in European
private law in particular is doubtful. The reason is not that legal culture describes
something unimportant, rather that it describes inadequately something that is
very important. Talk of legal culture can be helpful insofar as it sensitises us for
important factors beyond legal rules and institutions: values, judicial knowledge,
practices, etc. The term legal culture may sometimes be useful to refer to the
aggregation of these factors, when the relationship between them is irrelevant.
Otherwise, it is frequently more exact and productive, and less misleading, to
discuss these factors themselves.
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